Introduction
Since the early 1980s, national regulation of markets in Europe has been transformed. (Blum & Louge 1998) . The growth of the EU internal market has resulted in collisions with other policies, both at the EU level and nationally (Hine & Kassim 1998) . The development has made it more difficult, for example, to maintain effective national regulation in the public health arena (Holder et al. 1998 ).
The participation of Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden in the European Economic Area (EEA) since January, 1994, and the mem- Denmark is excluded from consideration in this article, since it does not have a retail monopoly on alcoholic beverages.
Previous research
Governments have traditionally often monopolized commodities or services, for instance gambling, prescription drugs, tobacco and alcohol, for various reasons (Room 1993) . Among these reasons have been promoting health or public order. A historical argument for having monopolies has been to provide revenue for the government but, as Room (1993, 183) argues, "From the point of view of state revenue, it is the wholesale level that it is crucial to monopolize. […] But from the point of view of public health and order interests, the wholesale level is almost irrelevant:
it is the retail level that is crucial". Another general argument for monopolizing the handling of alcoholic beverages is to regulate the market and eliminate private profits. Government retail monopolies generally have a lower number of retail stores, fewer opening hours, a more effective system for enforcing legislated limits on sales, for example to intoxicated and underage persons, are more restrained in sales promotions, and result in less pres-sure on the political and legal system from private interests (Room 1993; Holder 1993 In the 1990s, research on the Nordic alcohol monopolies was invigorated by consideration of the changes that were expected to follow the imminent European integration (Tigerstedt & Rosenqvist 1995) .
Implications for the monopolies were pointed out, and the different responses and strategies of the Nordic countries were outlined (Österberg 1993; Ugland 1996 Ugland , 2002 Horverak 1993; Ólafsdóttir 1993) .
Mäkelä and Tigerstedt (1993) reasoned that state alcohol monopolies were an outcome of an interplay of temperance movements with national and class movements. They concluded that the monopolies as a tool to reduce harm were threatened because the handling of the alcohol problem was no longer a social issue. Horverak (1993) questioned the future of the Norwegian retail monopoly when stating that: " [t] here is nothing to suggest that Norwegian alcohol policy will forevermore be based on a monopoly arrangement for retail sale of wine and spirits, and that the Norwegian people will be content with that. On the contrary, it is easy to imagine that the Vinmonopolet will merely be a short-lived intermezzo in Norwegian alcohol policy". For natural reasons, much of the literature has focused on external threats, i.e., those posed by the EU in general and by the adjustment to the EU's regulations in particular (Holder et al. 1998; Ugland 2002; Kühlhorn & Björ 1998; Mäkelä & Tigerstedt 1993) . European integration has also been studied by Tigerstedt (2001) Table 1 ). (2000); Österberg & Karlsson, (2002); Holder et al. (1998) 1) ÁtVr closed down their production in 1992.
2) strong beer was moved into the monopoly in 1993, in preparation for entering the eea. In Sweden, medium strong beer up to 3.5% is sold in the grocery stores.
Characteristics of the five Nordic alcohol monopolies today
As has been demonstrated, the Nordic alcohol monopolies were not all alike prior to the EEA/EU regulation, and their roles and their relationship with the state administration and with general alcohol policy varied somewhat from country to country.
An overview over the main characteristics of the five Nordic alcohol monopolies today is presented in Table 2 .
Faroe Islands
Unlike the other Nordic alcohol monopo- A customer survey carried out in 1996
showed that the customers were displeased with how long they had to wait to be served (Myklebust 2006) . In 1998, the 
Pressure and developments from 1994
In this following part we will try to summarize national and international tendencies and events that have been important for or affected the Nordic monopolies since the watershed years of 1994-95. (Table 3) .
International level
Decreasing market share 
Comparison
The differences between the countries re- 2) The basic idea in the EEA-agreement is that the EFTA countries (except Switzerland, which did not sign the agreement) are a part of the internal market, but outside the institutional system and decision-making process of the EU. With a few exceptions, the set of rules and regulations for free movement of goods, services, people, and capital, also apply for the EFTA-countries. The regulations in the EEA-agreement are therefore very similar to the treaties of the EU, and the EFTA countries are continuously adapting to the changes in legislation that are made within the EU.
3) The indicative levels for travellers between EU countries are 10 liters of spirits, 90 liters of wine and 110 liters of strong beer. However, the limits are indicative and, for example, Finnish customs are nowadays using 50 litres of distilled spirits as the amount for personal use.
